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CHILD EXCLUSION POLICIES IN HOUSING
By LARRY D. BARNErr*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most intractable problems of the twentieth cen-
tury will prove to be population growth.' Evidence indicates
that the current size of the population of the United States is
a serious problem, having created the potential for severe
shortages of natural resources and have effected reductions in
privacy.' At the same time, contrary to an apparently popular
belief,3 the number of Americans is increasing at a substantial
pace, with approximately 1,400,000 more births than deaths
each year in the United States.4 However, it is not at all appar-
* Assistant Professor, Widener College Law School, P.O. Box 7474, Concord Pike,
Wilmington, Delaware 19803. B.A., University of California, Los Angeles; M.S., Ore-
gon State University; Ph.D., Florida State University; J.D., University of Florida.
Professor Barnett served on the board of directors of Zero Population Growth from
1969-71 and from 1974-76, and he was its president from 1970 to 1971. See note 73 infra.
I Research indicates that there is only a weak link among Americans between a
concern with the population problem and a personal determination to act in a manner
necessary to solve it. See generally, Barnett, U.S. Population Growth as anAbstractly-
Perceived Problem, 7 DEMOGRAPHY 53 (1970); Barnett, Zero Population Growth, Inc.:
A Second Study, 6 J. BiosocuL Sci. 1, 12-15 (1974); Barnett, Zero Population Growth,
Inc.: Membership Characteristics and Population Policy Attitudes 17-19 (unpublished
manuscript); Kruegel, Further Comment on J. Blake's "Can We Believe Recent Data
on Birth Expectations in the United States?, "12 DEMOGRAPHY 157 (1975); McCutcheon
& Vick, Racial Differences in Attitudes toward Population Control and Overpopulation
as an Abstract Problem, 27 VA. J. Sci. 10 (1976); V. THOMPSON, M. APPELBAum, & J.
ALLEN, POPULATION PoUcy AccEPTANCE: PSYCHoLoIcAL DrEamiNANTs 35 (Carolina
Population Center Monograph No. 20, 1974).
2 See Barnett, Population Growth, Population Organization Participants, and the
Right of JPrivacy, 12 FAMILY L. Q. 37 (1978); Barnett, The Constitution and State
Powers of Export Limitation, 13 TULSA L.J. 229 (1977).
A national sample survey of adults in 1971 found that the majority (57 percent)
believed that the size of the U.S. population at that time was "about right." Approxi-
mately one out of five (22 percent) felt the size of the population "should be smaller,"
a proportion substantially greater than that feeling it "should be larger" (8 percent).
Wolman, Findings of the Commission's National Public Opinion Survey, in ASPECTS
OF POPULATION GROWTH POUCY 469, 494 (Vol. VI of the Research Reports of the U.S.
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, edited by R. Parke &
C. Westoff 1972).
For an explanation of the reasons for the erroneous belief, see Barnett, The
Constitutionality of Selected Fertility Control Policies, 55 N.C. L. REv. 357 (1977).
Public Health Service, Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths for November
1978, 27 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REP. 1 (No. 11, 1979).
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ent that the traditional approach of family planning - provid-
ing birth control methods and permitting individuals to deter-
mine their family size as they see fit - will be sufficient to
bring population numbers into line with the carrying capacity
of the environment. Indeed, the evidence indicates that
"individuals will employ [birth control] methods only when
they have, in their judgment, good reasons for doing so ...
It follows that a successful birth control policy will have to
strengthen and create family limitation incentives, rather than
concentrating solely on problems of birth control availability
and legitimation."5
If population growth is to be controlled in the United
States, it will be necessary to promote incentives reducing the
motivation to have children. Formal fertility control policies
have been proposed,' but their adoption in the foreseeable fu-
ture seems unlikely. One possible solution is the fostering of
environmental conditions that may not be overtly designed and
developed for a fertility control purpose but that nevertheless
have a tendency to reduce the number of births. One such
condition - the policies of apartments and condominiums of
excluding children - is the subject of this article. 7
Little precise information is available on the extent to
which parents are unable to rent housing because of child ex-
clusion policies. One survey of newspaper advertisements in
the Los Angeles metropolitan area indicated that 60 to 80 per-
cent of apartments for rent are not available to persons with
children.8 However, an analysis of the listings of a large com-
I Blake & Gupta, Reproductive Motivation versus Contraceptive Technology: Is
Recent American Experience an Exception?, 1 POPULATION & DaV. RaV. 229,246 (1975).
1 Barnett, supra note 3; Hollingsworth, A "Contingency Plan" of Economic Incen-
tive to Limit U.S. Reproduction, 6 ENVT'L AFF. 301 (1978); Rabin, Population Control
Through Financial Incentives, 23 HASTMGs L.J. 1353 (1972).
1 Another condition widely assumed to lower fertility is female employment. Re-
search has found that employed women have fewer children than women not em-
ployed, but recent evidence indicates that the causal connection runs just one way:
from family size to employment. In other words, the number of children women have
affects the probability they will be employed, but their employment status does not
affect their childbearing. Smith-Lovin & Tickamyer, Nonrecursive Models of Labor
Force Participation, Fertility Behavior and Sex Role Attitudes, 43 AM. Soc. Rav. 541,
554 (1978); Ware, Fertility and Work-force Participation: The Experience of Mel-
bourne Wives, 30 POPULATION STU. 413 (1976). See also Terry, Rival Explanations in
the Work-Fertility Relationship, 29 POPULATION STUD. 191 (1975).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Fair Housing for Children Coalition at 3-9, Marina Point,
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mercial rental agency in Los Angeles over a two-year period
suggests that child exclusion policies are found in only about
40 percent of the rental units in the area.' Another study con-
ducted of apartment rental advertisements in newspapers pub-
lished in the Chicago metropolitan area found that 21 percent
of the advertisers would not rent to persons with children under
fourteen years of age even though a state statute banned such
discrimination."0 It is not possible to know how prevalent such
policies would be in the absence of the statute.
While the prevalence of child exclusion policies is uncer-
tain and undoubtedly varies considerably from one geographic
area to another, it appears that such policies are sufficiently
frequent to be a visible irritant to parents wanting to rent an
apartment or purchase a condominium. If child exclusion poli-
cies were not a significant problem, it is unlikely that several
states would have enacted legislation prohibiting them and
that the Fair Housing for Children Coalition would have been
organized.II Given the prevalence of child exclusion policies, let
us examine both the justifications for them and the relevant
statutory and case law, paying particular attention to the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of the policies where legislation has
not suppressed them.
I. JUSTIFICATION FOR CHILD EXCLUSION POLICIES
Combating the social pressure to bear children"-a phe-
nomenon labeled "pronatalism"-should be a major focus of
those concerned with population policy. To halt population
Ltd. v. Wolfson, Civ. No. A 14120 (App. Dep't Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cal.,
filed Sept. 18, 1978).
Id.
" O'Brien & Fitzgerald, Apartment for Rent- Children Not Allowed: The Illinois
Children in Housing Statute - Its Viability and a Proposal for Its Comprehensive
Amendment, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 64, 78 n.69 (1975).
" That the Coalition is concerned with a relatively prevalent practice is further
suggested by the fact that it received an award for its activities from the Los Angeles
Human Relations Commission. FAIR HousiNG FOR CHLDREN COALITION NEWSLErMR 1
(May/June 1978).
The address of the Coalition is Post Office Box 5877, Santa Monica, California
90405.
22 Blake, Coercive Pronatalism and American Population Policy, in ASPECTS OF
POPULATION GROWTH POLICY, supra note 2, at 81, 85; Franzwa, Pronatalism in Women's
Magazine Fiction, in PRONATALuSM 68 (E. Peck & J. Senderowitz eds. 1974);. Polit,
Sterotypes Relating to Family-Size Status, 40 J. MAm. & FAm. 105 (1978).
1978-79]
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growth immediately in the United States, the family size of
women now entering their childbearing years must be lowered
to an average of approximately one child each.'3 The attain-
ment of this average will be facilitated by increasing the inci-
dence of voluntary childlessness. Although there has been a
marked increase during the past decade in the proportion of
women in their childbearing years expecting to have no child-
ren,'4 the potential exists for a substantially higher proportion
to make that commitment. Child exclusion policies can help
this potential be realized.
Child exclusion policies in apartments and condominiums
will promote voluntary childlessness in two ways. First, the
existence of such policies is an incentive to decide against
childbearing because, if prevalent, the policies constitute a vis-
ible inconvenience to parents.'5 Second, the policies will permit
those wanting to remain childless to live in proximity to other
adults who have the same commitment, providing reinforce-
ment for the commitment.1
6
,3 Frejka, Demographic Paths to a Stationary Population: The U.S. in Interna-
tional Comparison, in DEMOGRAPHIC AND SociAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION GROwTH 623,
633 (Vol. I of the Research Reports of the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and
the American Future, edited by C. Westoff & R. Parke, 1972).
The one-child family is required for immediate population stabilization because
of the disproportionately large number of persons of childbearing age in the population
at this time-the result of the baby boom after World War TI. Such persons have a
comparatively low death rate and thus will provide far more births than deaths even
if each couple simply reproduces itself by having two children. See Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Projections of the Population of the United States:
1977 to 2050, CURRENT POPULATION REP. (Series P-25, No. 704, 1977).
" The proportion of all wives in their childbearing years expecting to have no
children increased from 3.1 percent in 1967 to 5.7 percent in 1977. The increase was
not uniform across all groups, however. Among black wives, the increase was minimal
(from 4.0 to 4.4 percent). Among white wives, on the other hand, the expected inci-
idence of childlessness almost doubled (from 3.0 to 5.8 percent). Bureau of the Census,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Fertility of American Women: June 1977, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REP. 24 (Series P-20, No. 325, 1978); Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Previous and Prospective Fertility: 1967, CURRENT POPULATION REP. 17-19 (Se-
ries P-20, No. 211, 1971).
A study of trends on childlessness starting in 1910 concludes that white women,
but not non-white women, who began their childbearing period after 1965 exhibit an
increasing incidence of voluntary childlessness. Poston & Gotard, Trends in Childless-
ness in the United States, 1910-1975, 24 Soc. BIOLOGY 212 (1977).
15 See Curry & Scriven, The Relationship Between Apartment Living and Fertility
for Blacks, Mexican-Americans, and Other Americans in Racine, Wisconsin, 15
DEMOGRAPHY 477 (1978).
,1 Research on voluntary childlessness supports this conclusion. For example, a
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Aside from its implications for population control, volun-
tary childlessness should be protected and promoted because
individuals choosing this lifestyle may possess a higher level of
creativity than the average person. Research has found that
two key characteristics of creative individuals are independ-
ence and introversion. 7 Both of these traits appear to be more
common among persons choosing to remain childless than
among the general population."
study of twenty-seven unmarried female undergraduate college students who stated
that they wanted to remain childless and who were matched on a series of characteris-
tics with twenty-seven of their counterparts who wanted to have children found that
group support was important in maintaining the commitment to voluntary childless-
ness. Houseknecht, Reference Group Support for Voluntary Childlessness: Evidence
for Conformity, 39 J. MARR. & F m. 285 (1977). This study, however, focused on
individuals who had articulated a desire to avoid parenthood relatively early in life,
not those who came to the decision through a series of postponements of childbearing.
A study of fifty-one currently-married women who were childless by choice found that
postponement was the more frequent route to a commitment to voluntary childless-
ness, with approximately two-thirds of the sample falling in this category. The data
from the study indicated that group support for the decision not to have children was
of somewhat greater importance for the postponers than for the early articulators.
Houseknecht, Timing of the Decision to Remain Voluntarily Childless: Evidence for
Continuous Socialization, PsYcH. WoMEN Q. (forthcoming in 1979). It thus appears
that the decision of the individual to be childless must have group support which must
be continuous over time, rather than exist at just one critical point in the life cycle.
Furthermore, in a study of the membership of the National Organization for Non-
Parents (an organization discussed infra at notes 19-21), two out of three members
under 35 years of age intending to have no children reported experiencing pressures to
have children, with the media, friends, and coworkers (but not parents) most often
named as the leading sources of the pressure. Barnett & MacDonald, A Study of the
Membership of the National Organization for Non-Parents, 23 Soc. BIOLOGY 297
(1976). These sources are continuous in nature, suggesting that reinforcement for the
decision not to have children must also be continuous. See generally G. HoMANs, THE
HUMAN GROUP 120 (1950).
'1 Dellas & Gaier, Identification of Creativity: The Individual, 73 PSYCH. BULL. 5,
65, 68 (1970); Buhler, Keith-Spiegel, & Thomas, Developmental Psychology, in
HANDBOOK OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 861, 886 (B. Wolman ed. 1973); Schubert & Biondi,
Creativity and Mental Health: Part III - Creativity and Adjustment, 11 J. CRAIEv
BEHAVIOR 186, 189 (1977).
11 Barnett, Population Growth, Population Organization Participants, and the
Right of Privacy, 12 FAM. L.Q. 37, 42-46 (1978); Barnett & MacDonald, supra note 16,
at 304, 309; Houseknecht, A Social Psychological Model of Voluntary Childlessness, 1
ALT. LiFzsYLs 379, 387-89 (1978); Houseknecht, Reference Group Support for Volun-
tary Childlessness: Evidence for Conformity, supra note 16, at 291; Silka & Kiesler,
Couples Who Choose to Remain Childless, 9 FiAm. PLAN. PERspECTIvES 16, 22 (1977).
Moreover, there is evidence that, in at least some occupations requiring a rela-
tively high level of creativity, the childless are more productive than those with chil-
dren. In a study of married research chemists holding the Ph.D. and employed in
1978-79]
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While there are at least two national organizations directly
concerned with the childfree lifestyle - the National Organiza-
tion for Non-Parents'9 and the Coalition for Optional Parent-
hood Education0 - neither organization has taken a position
on child exclusion policies.2' Their reluctance to support child
exclusion policies stems from an explicit commitment to the
goal of maximizing individual freedom and from an implicit
commitment to its corollary - the assumption that individuals
are rational and will act in the best interests of society. While
this assumption may well be acceptable in many areas, it does
not appear to be useful in population policy and the control of
population size. For instance, population policymakers as-
sumed for many years that a reduction in death rates among
universities or in government laboratories, those without children were found to have
a substantially greater output of research articles than those with children. The differ-
ential in favor of the childless existed among both male and female chemists. Hargens,
McCann & Reskin, Productivity and Reproductivity: Fertility and Professional
Achievement among Research Scientists, 57 Soc. FORCES 154 (1978).
11 Studies of the membership of the organization appear in Barnett, supra note
18; Barnett & MacDonald, supra note 16.
The national office of the organization is located at 3 North Liberty Street, Balti-
more, Maryland 21201.
" Information about the Coalition's member organizations, goals, and purposes
is available from the National Organization for Non-Parents at the address in note 19
supra.
21 The reasons for this occurence are set out in a letter from Carole Goldman, the
Executive Director of the National Organization for Non-Parents and Chairwoman of
the Coalition for Optional Parenthood Education, to Larry D. Barnett (Sept. 12, 1978).
There exists a wide range of opinions among N.O.N. members themselves
and among other organizations [on this issue]. On the one hand, some feel
that individuals have a right to pursue their own lifestyle choice, which
includes the right to live in an environment that is childfree. Others question
whether or not such an arrangement might represent discrimination based
on parental status. The National Organization for Non-Parents, in its policy
statement regarding human rights, states, "The National Organization for
Non-Parents supports the right of every individual to be free of social, eco-
nomic or political discrimination based on parental status, sex, age, race,
religion, national origin, physical or developmental handicap, marital status,
or sexual orientation." Would all adult housing discriminate against individ-
uals based on parental status? This is the question that remains unresolved
and, therefore, the organization has not taken a stand on this issue. . ..
In regard to COPE, the Coalition for Optional Parenthood Education,
its policy statements . . . also reflect our endorsement of the individual's
choice as to whether to lead a childfree lifestyle or to become a parent. In
regard to all adult housing, . . . COPE is concerned that our government
and our society in general does not discriminate in attitude or policy against
parents or non-parents.
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children would lead parents to realize they needed fewer chil-
dren to have a given number survive to adulthood; therefore,.
it was assumed that a reduction in child mortality would be
followed by a lowered fertility rate, resulting in no greater ex-
cess of births over deaths. However, recent demographic re-
search has consistently found that fertility reductions are sub-
stantially less than child mortality reductions and that, as a
consequence, a lowered child mortality rate generates addi-
tional populaton growth.2 Another illustration is that, when
individuals do reduce their childbearing intentions in response
to programs of population education, they do so only within the
socially-accepted norm of two, three, or four children and they
possess only a weak commitment to a reduced level of child-
bearing.2
The population problem is unlikely to be solved, then, by
reliance on a presumed rationality of the individual in child-
bearing decisions and his or her concern with the interests of
society. Steps must be taken to promote conditions that will
motivate individuals to lower their fertility. Policies overtly
and directly aimed at this goal - such as a tax on childbearing
- will probably be politically unacceptable in the foreseeable
future, and therefore indirect measures will be necessary to
control fertility. Child exclusion policies have the potential for
being one such influential measure, since approximately
thirty-five percent of all occupied housing space is composed
of rental units. 24 To the extent that such policies become more
common, the rate of voluntary childlessness will increase, con-
tributing to a reduction in fertility. Let us turn, accordingly,
to an examination of the legal status of the policies in the
United States today.
" See Barnett, Population Control and Child Mortality: Constitutional Issues in
Recent Demographic Research, 1979 HAMLINE L. Rav. 57.
z' Barnett, Zero Population Growth, Inc.: A Second Study, supra note 1, at 12-
15; Blake, Can We Believe Recent Data on Birth Expectations in the United States?,
11 DEMOGRAPHY 25 (1974); Kruegel, supra note 1. See generally Coombs, Underlying
Family-Size Preferences and Reproductive Behavior, 19 STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING
25, 29-30 (1979).
24 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TE
UNrED STATES: 1978 792 (99th ed. 1978).
The effect of child exclusion policies in condominiums is likely to be minimal,
because condominiums satisfy only a small fraction of housing demand. In 1977, only
five percent of all owner-occupied housing units were in structures with two ot more
units and only two percent were in structures with three or more units. Id. at 794.
1978-79]
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II. STATUTORY LAW
Six states expressly prohibit child exclusion policies: Ari-
zona, 25 Delaware, 2 Illinois,21 Massachusetts,2 New Jersey,
29
and New York. 0 Other states have statutes that deal with dis-
crimination on the basis of age. For example, Michigan prohib-
its a person from discriminating or refusing to engage in a real
estate transaction "on the basis of. . .age" or from advertis-
ing in a manner that indicates an intent to discriminate on this
basis'.3 The predecessor to this Michigan law was interpreted
by the state Attorney General to prohibit a landlord from refus-
ing to rent to a tenant with children. 32 Since the wording of the
current law is essentially unchanged, the same prohibition
probably applies to it., New Hampshire prohibits discrimina-
tion "because of age," 34 but there is not any indication whether
the ban will apply to the refusal to sell or rent to individuals
who have children. Montana prohibits discrimination using the
same statutory language as New Hampshire but adds that the
prohibition does not apply "when the distinction is based on
reasonable grounds."35 The District of Columbia prohibits age
discrimination in real estate transactions8 except in the case
of condominiums where the occupancy of "some or all of the
units" has been restricted on the basis of age.37 Finally, the
state of Washington has invalidated discrimination due to age
and other characteristics (for example, race and sex) because
"such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. H8 33-303, 33-1317 (Supp. 1978).
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 6503 (1974).
27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 37 (1973).
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1978).
21 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 170-92 (West 1971).
30 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw §§ 236, 237 (McKinney 1968).
31 MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(502) (1978).
The law does not apply to certain rental housing if there are a small number of
apartments or buildings or if the housing is intended primarily for senior citizens. Id.
§ 3.548(503).
3 MICH. Op. ATr'y GEN. 4953 (1976).
3 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.548(502) (1978) (comment).
34 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8(IV),(V)(a)(Supp. 1977). This statute has excep-
tions similar to those of the Michigan statute noted in note 31 supra. Id. § 354-A:8(V-
b) (Supp. 1977).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-306(4) (Supp. 1977).
D.C. CODE § 6-2231(a) (Supp. V 1978).
D.C. CODE § 5-1218(c) (Supp. V 1978).
[Vol. 67
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privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the institutions and
foundation of a free democratic state."3 However, no mention
is made of age in the statutory sections dealing with real estate
transactions, 9 suggesting that age discrimination in housing is
permissible.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Three provisions of the Constitution are presently appli-
cable to child exclusion policies: the due process clauses of the
fourteenth and fifth amendments" and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment." These Constitutional
guarantees, however, are only restrictions on governmental ac-
tion; they do not protect the individual against the conduct of
another who is acting as a private party.42 Thus the initial
question is whether governmental action can be found in child
exclusion policies.
A. The State Action Question
In the area of housing, governmental action has not been
found in lawsuits against private landlords whose buildings
were constructed with money provided by a mortgage insured
by the federal government 3 or whose buildings, occupied by
low-income families, were the beneficiaries of interest-
reduction payments from the federal government and partial
WASH. REv. CODE § 49.60.010 (1976).
" WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.030(1)(c), 49.60.222 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
' The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was applied in the case of
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Moore involved a city ordinance
that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. For a further
discussion of Moore, see text accompanying notes 49-57 infra.
In Franklin v. White Egret Condominiums, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 58-60, a Florida appellate court
identified a "right of procreation" which was infringed by a child exclusion policy. This
right has been held to emanate from the guarantee of liberty provided by the due
process clause. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
41 See Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1975); Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
42 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948).
3 McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 994 (1971).
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exemptions from state real property taxes." However, financial
benefits from government to private landlords combined with
substantial regulations imposed by government have been suf-
ficient to generate a finding of government action, 5 especially
when the housing was built on land obtained by an urban re-
newal agency having the power of eminent domain.48 Use of the
judiciary for eviction has been held by a number of courts to
be insufficient by itself to warrant a finding of state action,"
but there is precedent to support the contrary argument. The
U.S. Supreme Court, without even discussing the issue of gov-
ernmental action, has reached the merits of a fourteenth
amendment challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute
prescribing the conditions and procedures for obtaining a court
order of eviction of a tenant;48 the Court seems implicitly to
have found that governmental action existed in the use of the
judiciary. The Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer," held that judicial
enforcement of real property covenants results in state action.
Furthermore, the Court has concluded that, while the mere
existence of a statute authorizing a procedure to be undertaken
by private parties without the involvement of the judicial sys-
tem is not an adequate basis for governmental action, such
" Weigand v. Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973). See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z-1 (1976).
11 Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investdirs, 504
F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973); Owens
v. Housing Auth., 394 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (D. Conn. 1975); Dew v. McLendon
Gardens Ass'n, 394 F. Supp. 1223, 1230 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Bloodworth v. Oxford Village
Townhouses, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 709, 716-17 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Anderson v. Denny, 365
F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (W.D. Va. 1973). See Fenner v. Bruce Manor, Inc., 409 F. Supp.
1332, 1343 (D. Md. 1976). Contra, Rodriguez v. Towers Apartments, Inc., 416 F. Supp.
304 (D.P.R. 1976).
1, Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 943 (2d Cir. 1974); Male
v. Crossroads Ass'n, 469 F.2d 616, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1972); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971); Short v. Fulton Redevelopment Co., 390 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.I. 1972); Colon v.
Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11 Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 974 (1976); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973); Weigand v.
Afton View Apartments, 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973); Lavoie v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7
(1st Cir. 1972); McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970); Fallis
v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (N.D. Ohio 1974); affl'd, 532 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir.
1976); Mullarkey v. Borglum, 323 F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
" Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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action will occur when the judiciary ordersprivate parties to
act and a person is deprived of property to which he has a
claim.A0 Court-ordered eviction would seem sufficient to meet
the criterion laid down by the Supreme Court in these deci-
sions. Since cases exist where occupants of multiple-dwelling
buildings have been subjected to or threatened with eviction
through court proceedings because they had children,5 1 let us
examine the constitutional issues in child exclusion policies.
B. The Constitutional Questions
1. Right to Structure Family Living Arrangements
A recent Supreme Court case, Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, Ohio,52 has a marked bearing on the constitutionality of
child exclusion policies. In Moore, a city ordinance limited
occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family, but
the term "family" was defined in such a manner as to exclude
the appellant grandmother and her two grandsons, who were
first cousins. The appellant, who was fined twenty-five dollars
and sentenced to five days in jail for violating the ordinance,
challenged the legislation as violative of the liberty protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Supreme Court agreed, saying that the ordinance deprived the
appellant of freedom of choice in the realm of family life and
that the extended family, as well as the nuclear family of hus-
band, wife, and children, must be given protection.
The protection extended by the Court to the family inter-
est in residing together was apparently the strictest available
under the Constitution. The four-member plurality and the
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.10 (1978).
, Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So.2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Hope for Children v. Monumental Properties, Inc., No. 78-4304 (Dekalb County,
Georgia, Super. Ct., filed Aug. 4, 1978).
A case in California involves a child exclusion policy on the part of a privately-
owned apartment that is situated on land owned by and leased from Los Angeles
County and that is part of a small boat harbor project having both publicly- and
privately-owned facilities. Brief for Appellants at 41-49, Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson,
Cir. No. A14120 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't, Los Angeles County, Cal., filed Aug. 28, 1978).
Such an arrangement may constitute governmental action. See Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). However, the highest court hearing the case ren-
dered its decision on statutory, not constitutional, grounds. 47 U.S.L.W. 2437 (1979).
52 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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concurring opinions appear to have applied the most stringent
test of constitutionality to the ordinance: the government is
required to demonstrate that a compelling interest is served by
its action and that the means used are so circumscribed as to
achieve only that interest.5 3 The ordinance failed the second
part of the test - it did not promote the governmental interests
at stake. The ordinance failed to achieve the city's objectives,
which were the prevention of overcrowded housing, the allevia-
tion of traffic congestion and parking shortages, and the elimi-
nation of unnecessary financial burdens on the school system.
As the Court stated:
Although these are legitimate goals, the ordinance before us
serves them marginally, at best. For example, the ordinance
permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and
unmarried children to live together, even if the family con-
tains a half-dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own
car. At the same time it forbids an adult brother and sister
to share a household, even if both faithfully use public trans-
portation. The ordinance would permit a grandmother to live
with a single dependent son and children, even if his school-
age children number a dozen, yet it forces Mrs. Moore to find
another dwelling for her grandson John, simply because of
the presence of his uncle and cousin in the same household.
We need not labor the point. [The ordinance] has but a
tenuous relation to alleviation of the conditions mentioned by
the city."
The Court was able to avoid the question of whether the inter-
ests of the city were sufficient to justify the ordinance. Al-
0 "Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regu-
lation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,'...
and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." Roe v. Wade, 419 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
There is no explicit statement in Moore by the four-member plurality or two-
member concurring opinions that this test is employed in the decision. However, the
plurality opinion rejects the use of the less stringent, reasonable relationship test
(discussed in the text at note 55 infra) and states that the case implicates the test
applied in Roe v. Wade, 431 U.S. at 498-99. The two-member concurring opinion
argues that the city ordinance imposes "burdens on fundamental rights." Id. at 513.
The compelling governmental interest test will also be applied where governmen-
tal action has created a "suspect" class; see text accompanying notes 72-74 infra for
further discussion on this point.
1 431 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion).
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though these interests may have been "legitimate," there was
no decision regarding whether the interests were "compelling."
Moore invoked the compelling governmental interest test
because there was a substantial, direct interference with the
constitutional right to freedom in family living arrangements .
5
However, Moore involved an ordinance with city-wide applica-
tion,56 and it was arguably this feature that created the sub-
stantial interference; the ordinance was not limited to a spe-
cific geographic area or to a specific type of housing accomoda-
tion. It is therefore questionable whether the compelling inter-
est test should be applied to a practice, or even an ordinance,
having only limited application.
5
1
Riley v. Stoves,5 1 an Arizona decision rendered prior to
Moore, used the less stringent of the two tests of constitution-
ality under due process and equal protection. Under that test,
governmental action is upheld if it-is reasonably related to a
legitimate goal.59 In Riley, the developer of a large tract of land
for mobile homes reserved a portion for persons who were at
least twenty-one years of age. Finding governmental action in
the judicial enforcement of the restriction, the court held that
the policy was not a denial of equal protection because it rea-
sonably advanced the legitimate purpose of reducing noise and
other disturbances in a residential area."0 It is uncertain, of
course, whether Moore might have changed the decision; the
court might have distinguished Moore on the grounds that the
policy was not applicable to an entire city but only to a small
portion of it, that as a result of this fact there was no substan-
tial interference with freedom of the individual to select family
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 387 (1978).
"431 U.S. at 496.
Cf. Molino v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Glassboro, 281 A.2d 401 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (city-wide zoning ordinance that required at least 70% of
the units in apartment complexes to be one-bedroom held to violate the equal protec-
tion clause).
526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
" Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Weinber-
ger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771-74 (1975).
" 526 P.2d at 753.
In a variation of the rational relationship test, the court said that, since the state
did not develop the restriction but only enforced it, the test of constitutionality would
be whether the restriction reasonably promoted a legitimate private, not governmen-
tal, objective. Id. at 752.
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living arrangements, and that the compelling interest test was
therefore inapplicable.'
2. The Right of Procreation
In Franklin v. White Egret Condominiums, Inc.,62 a Flor-
ida case involving the exclusion of children, the reasoning in
Moore was extended. At issue was a condominium policy pro-
hibiting the purchase of an apartment to be occupied by chil-
dren under twelve years of age. Finding governmental action
in the condominium's use of the courts to enforce its policy, it
was held that the policy must be evaluated under the compel-
ling governmental interest test because it seriously infringed at
least one fundamental constitutional right: the right of privacy
insofar as* it protects decisions regarding procreation. 3 No off-
setting compelling interest was found to be advanced by the
policy in this case; a possible reduction in noise was not consid-
ered a compelling interest. 4
The argument of the court that child exclusion policies
seriously infringe on childbearing decisions is difficult to accept
under Supreme Court precedents. A statute prohibiting an
abortion except to save the life of the pregnant woman has been
held to have a direct and substantial impact on the right of
privacy,65 while the action of a state in providing funds for
childbirth services but not abortions for indigent women has
been held not to do so. 6 More-over, a state regulation imposing
a maximum on welfare assistance for recipients of Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children, even though the maximum
grant was less than the state-calculated need of families with
a large number of members, has been held not to be a serious
' In Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Ct. App.
1978), a California court could have made this distinction. The court faced a condomi-
nium policy that excluded persons under 18 years of age but avoided mentioning
Moore, which had been decided a year earlier. The court upheld the policy as reasona-
ble but did not expressly base its decision on constitutional grounds.
,1 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
1 Id. at 1089-90. Other rights mentioned were marriage, interstate travel, direct-
ing the upbringing and enjoying the companionship of one's children, and family living
arrangements.
11 Id. at 1090.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
1 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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infringement on childbearing decisions. 7 Similar reasoning
had led to the conclusion that denial of welfare assistance to
women pregnant with their first child does not seriously inter-
fere with procreation.68 In short, the limitation or denial of
welfare assistance for an abortion or for supporting children
does not implicate the constitutional right of privacy in a direct
and subst'antial manner. Child exclusion policies in housing
would appear to be of a similar nature. If indigents suffer no
serious infringement on their right of privacy because they are
unable to obtain certain finances for an abortion or for support-
ing their children, individuals who are unable to obtain certain
housing because they have children will also not experience a
direct and substantial infringement of a fundamental constitu-
tional right. Lack of access to necessary or desired finances and
lack of access to necessary or desired housing are equally dis-
tant from the constitutionally-protected activity of procrea-
tion. Consequently, if the only constitutional right implicated
by child exclusion policies is that right protecting procreation,
the compelling governmental interest test is inappropriate.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has utilized
this line of reasoning in a decision rendered prior to Moore. In
Bynes v. Toll, 9 a state university barred children from the
housing it made available to married students. In response to
a challenge on the ground that the distinction between married
students on the basis of whether they had children created a
classification denying equal protection, the court rejected the
use of the compelling governmental interest test. It cited three
reasons for its decision: a Supreme Court case holding that
there is no constitutionally-guaranteed right to housing of a
particular type or quality;7° the principle that housing for stu-
dents falls within an area traditionally committed to the dis-
cretion of school authorities; and the view that there was no
direct, substantial interference with the right of privacy. On
the last point the court said:
, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1670).
" Alcala v. Bums, 545 F.2d 1101 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977);
Taylor v. Hill, 429 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.N.C. 1976); aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 961 (1977);
Murrow v. Clifford, 404 F. Supp. 999 (D.N.J. 1975).
$ 512 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1975).
71 Id. at 255 (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)).
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The University here is not interfering with the marital
privacy of the plaintiffs or their unquestioned natural right
to bring up their children. They are totally free to procreate
and educate their offspring - the only question is whether
the University is constitutionally mandated to provide them
campus housing to perform their protected prerogatives."
Finding dangers to children from fire, construction, and traffic
on campus, the court upheld the ban.
If child exclusion policies do not seriously interfere with
procreation, as has been contended here, the reasonable rela-
tionship test should be used, at least where the policies have
not been adopted by government and given the force of law
applicable to an entire political jurisdiction. Challenges to the
creation of communities with housing confined to the older age
groups have been reviewed under the less stringent test and,
using that test, rebuffed. 2 These decisions have been given
support by a Supreme Court case holding that old age is not a
"suspect" class and that challenges to classifications involving
old age therefore do not require the use of the compelling gov-
ernmental interest test.
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those
who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or
national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful
unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities
on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative
of their abilities.73
This reasoning can be applied equally well to children and
their parents. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already stated,
though arguably in dictum, that family size is not a suspect
criterion for a classification, 74 permitting distinctions between
" 512 F.2d at 255. See also Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 70 N.E.2d 447, 448 (Ohio
1946) (apartment lease excluding children held not to prohibit childbearing).
72 Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 364 A.2d 1016 (N.J. 1976), appeal
dismissed, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning
Bd., 364 A.2d 1005 (N.J. 1976); Campbell v. Barraud, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (App. Div.
1977). Cf. Maldini v. Ambro, 330 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y. 1975), appeal dismissed 423 U.S.
993 (1975) (z6ning amendment to create a retirement community upheld as reasonable
under zoning power).
13 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). See also
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
11 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
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adults with one or more children and those without any chil-
dren to be subjected to the reasonable relationship test. More-
over, our society encourages childbearing7 5 and gives preferen-
tial treatment to parents. 7 There has been no history of invidi-
ous discrimination against those having children, and there is
accordingly no justification for finding a suspect class in indi-
viduals who have been refused housing accomodations by a
particular apartment or condominium because they have chil-
dren.
CONCLUSION
Child exclusion policies can be justified under the federal
constitution. They do not directly and substantially infringe on
the fundamental right of privacy protecting freedom of pro-
creation, and they create no suspect class. Moreover, as long
as the policies are not incorporated into law and made applica-
ble to all housing in a political jurisdiction, there is no substan-
tial interference with the freedom of the individual to choose
family living arrangements. Consequently, the action of apart-
ment and condominium owners in excluding children should
not be subjected to the compelling interest test. Protection of
the childfree lifestyle, with a concomitant increase in individ-
ual freedom and creativity, and promotion of population con-
trol are legitimate objectives, if not compelling interests,
73 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
1, For example, for purposes of the federal income tax, a taxpayer is entitled to a
tax credit for expenses for child care and household services where the expenses are
incurred to enable the taxpayer to work; the tax credit is 20 percent of such expenses
up to a maximum of $2000 for one dependent child under 15 years of age and a
maximum of $4000 for two or more dependent children. I.R.C. § 44A. In addition, a
taxpayer can currently deduct $750 for each dependent child from his income in deter-
mining taxable income. I.R.C. §§ 151(e), 152(a). Under the Revenue Act of 1978, this
amount will increase to $1000 for taxable years starting on or after January 1, 1979.
Pub. L. 95-600, §§ 102(a), 102(d), 92 Stat. 2771. The reason given for this increase is
that inflation has devalued the $750 exemption, S. REP. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 46 (1978). Ironically, excessive child bearing has been a major cause of the
inflation. L. BROWN, Tim TwNrY-NiNTH DAY 161-91 (1978). Congress has not recog-
nized that its action subsidizes an important cause of inflation and constitutes part of
a vicious circle.
An example in another area is public education, which is funded by all taxpayers
but which most directly benefits parents with children in the public schools. These
parents do not have to pay the full cost of the services provided. In 1978, the average
expenditure in public primary and secondary schools in the United States was esti-
mated to be $1,740. BuREAu OF TH CENsus, supra note 24, at 158.
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clearly advanced by these exclusionary policies. As a result, the
policies are constitutionally supportable.
However, the question still remains as to whether child
exclusion policies are desirable from the perspective of popula-
tion policy. The answer is affirmative if one assumes (1) that
there is a serious problem of overpopulation in the United
States, (2) that formal policies explicitly designed to curtail
fertility are unlikely to be adopted by the federal government
in the foreseeable future, and (3) that there are no other indi-
rect means to reduce the birth rate that are equally effective
and that carry fewer undesirable side-effects. It is the third
assumption of which the writer is uncertain. Nevertheless,
child exclusion policies in housing at least raise the issue of the
indirect means to control the birth rate. Such indirect means
are not consistent with the traditional family planning perspec-
tive but nonetheless might be promoted in the United States.
The issue is in need of the attention of population policymak-
ers.
The likelihood that the issue will be discussed in the future
was enhanced by the action of the board of directors of Zero
Population Growth at its m~eting in October 1978.11 Zero Popu-
lation Growth came into existence in late 1968 in order to em-
phasize the environmental and resource problems of popula-
tion numbers in the United States, but it shifted its focus in
the early 1970's to promoting the availability of family plan-
ning methods and information."' Accepting the assumption
that the human species will act rationally and have the number
of children that is in the best interests of society at large, Zero
Population Growth urged and placed its principal emphasis on
promoting the availability of contraception, sterilization, and
abortion. 9  r
77 The observations made by the writer in the material following this point are in
large part the result of his personal involvement as a participant in the organization.
See autobiographical note preceding note 1.
11 See ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, A U.S. POPULATION POLICY: ZPG's
RECOMMENDATIONS (1976).
"' ZERO POPULATION GROWTH, supra note 78. The organization went even further
and advocated policies that may well increase fertility. Zero Population Growth called
for the "[alvailability of child care centers outside the home with public subsidies
for low-income women" and for child care expenses of working parents to be "treated
as an unreimbursed business expense in allowing for tax deductions, including child
care provided by paid relatives." Id. at 5. These policies may permit women to bear
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In 1978, the board of directors voted to return the organiza-
tion to its original emphasis on the actual control of population
size. However, it is not clear that the board recognized the type
of population policy it may be forced to advocate. Zero Popula-
tion Growth reached its zenith in membership and public influ-
ence during 1970 and 1971. Although there is evidence that its
message regarding the domestic population problem did indeed
reduce family size preferences," family size expectations have
remained at roughly the same level since the early 1970's, at
least for those under 30 years of age."' That level - namely, the
two-child family - is substantially above what is recom-
mended by the organization." Educational efforts and public-
ity regarding population were the primary concerns of Zero
Population Growth during its most influential period. Will
such activities again reduce fertility plans and do so to a signif-
icant extent? The answer is probably negative. The reduction
occurring in the early 1970's took place within the two-to-four
children they would not otherwise have borne because the time and expense of child-
bearing are reduced. See Card, The Malleability of Fertility-Related Attitudes and
Behavior in a Filipino Migrant Sample, 15 DEMOGRAPHY 459 (1978).
" Kruegel, supra note 1.
M The average number of births expected by currently-married women during
their lifetimes is shown below. The figures are lifetime births expected per 1,000
currently-married women of all races:
Age of woman
Year 18-24 25-29 30-34
1978 2,166 2,215 2,424
1977 2,137 2,197 2,468
1976 2,141 2,202 2,536
1975 2,173 2,260 2,610
1974 2,165 2,335 2,724
1973 2,262 2,387 2,804
1972 2,255 2,452 2,915
1971 2,375 2,619 2,989
1967 2,852 3,037 3,288
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Fertility of American Women: June
1978 (Advanced Report), CURRENT POPULATION REP. (Series P-20, No. 330, 1978); Bu-
reau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Fertility of American Women: June 1977,
CUnRR POPULATION REP. 2 (Series P-20, No. 325, 1978).
The organization advocates that by 1985 women entering their childbearing
years have an average of 1.6 children each during their lifetimes. ZERO POPULATION
GROWTH, supra note 78, at 3.
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child range that our society defines as socially desirable and
"normal," and the reduction was therefore one that was com-
paratively simple to achieve." However, a drop below the two-
child level as advocated by the organization will probably re-
quire relatively severe external restraints.84 Education and
other attempts to achieve an average family size in the one-
child range by strictly voluntary means are unlikely to be suc-
cessful.85 Since a policy manifestly designed to limit fertility is
not likely to be adopted in the foreseeable future, Zero Popula-
tion Growth may thus be forced to turn to conditions that
effectively but indirectly restrict fertility. 6 As that occurs, the
issue of indirect influences that are difficult to reconcile with
the perspective of the family planning movement in this coun-
try can be expected to receive attention in the field of popula-
tion policy.
m See Blake, supra note 23.
I" See id. See also Barnett, Zero Population Growth, Inc.: A Second Study, supra
note 1, at 12-15.
a See note 1 supra for the reason this effort will probably be unsuccessful; Falbo,
Reasons for Having an Only Child, 1 J. POPULATION 181 (1978).
11 In a survey of a randomly-selected sample of members of Zero Population
Growth conducted in November 1976, substantial support was found for two relatively
stringent fertility control measures. The first measure was a requirement that non-
indigent parents pay at least a portion of the cost of educating their children in the
public schools. One-third of the members favored such a charge for the first child, a
slight majority favored it for the second child, and four out of five favored it for the
third and fourth children. There was less, though still strong, support for a tax sur-
charge, i.e., a special tax, on the income of parents who have more than a particular
number of children. The majority of the membership opposed a surcharge for the first
two children, but four out of five favored it for the third and fourth children. It is
important to note that the members responded in terms of whether they supported or
opposed the adoption of the two measures at the present time, not at some point in
the future. Barnett, Zero Population Growth, Inc.: Membership Characteristics and
Population Policy Attitudes 9, 12-15 (unpublished manuscript).
A tuition charge in the public schools would be an indirect fertility control
measure if adopted today because it would not be enacted with the express goal of
curtailing fertility; rather, it would be used to attain other objectives, for example, tax
limitation. A tax surcharge for excessive childbearing would, by definition, be a direct
fertility control measure, but since such a measure is not politically acceptable at this
time, the membership must fall back on indirect fertility control incentives such as
tuition charges in the schools. Such charges are not consistent with the assumption of
the family planning perspective that individuals are rational with regard to childbear-
ing and will voluntary act in the best interests of society.
